“文澜国际贸易Seminar”是由中南财经政法大学工商管理学院国际贸易学科举办的特色专业学术交流平台，旨在通过与国内外国际贸易学者的交流，共同推进中国国际贸易研究的知识积累，为中国开放型经济发展提供学者观点和智力支持。
主 题：Ownership and R&D Intensity in Foreign Affiliates under Incomplete Capital Market
主 讲 人：武幼辉 博士候选人
主 持 人：钱学锋 教授
时 间：2015年1月12日（周一）10:00
地 点：文泉楼德鲁克之窗
主办单位：工商管理学院国际贸易教研室
主讲人介绍：
武幼辉，男，Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, State University of New York at Buffalo, USA.
Paper Abstracts:
The multinational firms can set foreign affiliates in the host country either with joint ownership or with full control. While joint venture is a dominated strategy in the property rights theory of firm, this paper argue that it can be optimal in the presence of contractual frictions and financial frictions. I build a model under incomplete contracts and show that, when capital market is complete, joint venture is strictly dominated by outsourcing if the contractual costs exist but are low. In the presence of financial frictions, however, the local suppliers will be the most financially vulnerable to credit constraints under outsourcing and may not be able to compensate the multinational firms with enough cash ex ante. In this case, outsourcing is dominated by joint venture when financial frictions are sufficiently high. In addition, compared with vertical integration, joint venture has more incentive for the local supplier to invest, yet it is also more vulnerable to financial frictions. Since the non-contractible investment is R&D intensive, this model implies that joint ventures are more R&D intensive than wholly foreign-owned enterprises and this result will be reinforced in financially more vulnerable industries. In addition, with the improvement of the capital market, the share of joint ventures in foreign affiliates is likely to decrease and should decrease greater in financially more vulnerable industries. These theoretical results are confirmed by empirical tests on the data of Chinese foreign affiliates.
